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"What features the contact tracing app 
has is an important element in how well 
the public accepts it and uses it. It 
should have minimal intrusion to a 
person’s life but has what is essential for 
contact tracing to be effective." 
- Anonymous Survey Respondent 
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Executive Summary  
Widespread adoption of a contact 
tracing app by the UK public is an 
important part of safely easing or lifting the 
lockdown. In this context, it is essential to 
understand how adoption rates are 
influenced by different configurations of a 
proposed contact tracing app. There are 
many implementation options that can 
impact app adoption. For example, which 
institution should be responsible for and 
have oversight of the app? What type of 
data is collected? Does it matter how long 
it is stored? This whitepaper provides data-
driven insights into these and other 
questions to guide app implementation 
choices.  
We conducted a choice-based conjoint 
study with a UK-wide representative 
sample (n=2061). Choice-based conjoint 
uses realistic choice scenarios (rather 
than less reliable attitude surveys) to 
measure preferences for product 
features, and to simulate the likely 
acceptance of a product. This allows us 
to estimate the adoption rate for various 
app configurations. 
We would like to highlight the following 
main findings:  
 
• It is possible to implement a contact 
tracing app that can achieve 
widespread adoption. 
• Adoption rates increase significantly if 
the NHS (as opposed to the 
government) has ownership and 
oversight of the contact tracing app. 
• Adoption rates increase significantly if 
app use is linked to priority testing for 
COVID-19 when in self-isolation.  
 
 
Based on simulations of adoption rates 
for different app configurations, we 
recommend a contact tracing app 
with the following configuration: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This suggested configuration strikes a 
balance between maximizing the 
uptake of the app while protecting 
privacy and civil liberties. We estimate 
that this configuration is likely to 
increase adoption by 22.4 percentage 
points over the NHSX app currently 
under development (based on our 
interpretation of limited information 
available in the public domain).   
This whitepaper discusses key findings 
from our study in detail. 
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Introduction 
In this whitepaper, we focus on understanding how the UK public views the introduction of a contact 
tracing app and how likely it is to adopt different configurations of such an app. This understanding is 
critical because a contact tracing app would not be effective unless there is significant public uptake 
—  no matter how technologically sophisticated or superior the app is. This is illustrated well by a recent 
study which suggests that approximately 60% of the adult population have to adopt the app to 
contain the pandemic (Ferretti et al., 2020). Achieving this adoption rate is not only essential to the 
app’s effectiveness, but also very challenging: Singapore’s TraceTogether app, often viewed as a 
success story, has only achieved 19.3% uptake to date (www.tracetogether.gov.sg).  
One particularly sensitive challenge for the successful implementation of a contact tracing app is 
navigating the potential privacy and civil liberty issues inherent in these apps. The UK government 
faces critical decisions — ranging from who will oversee the app, to what type of data will be 
collected and for how long it will be stored — that have privacy and civil liberty implications. This 
research provides data-driven insights into the impact of these decisions on app adoption.  
 
Methodology  
We use a choice-based conjoint design to study how people trade-off different attributes of a contact 
tracing app when making adoption decisions. This method derives individual preference functions for 
each respondent, so that we can estimate how changing one attribute of the app will affect uptake. 
This allows us to run simulations to estimate the likely adoption of different app configurations if brought 
to market.  
Based on contact-tracing app functionalities that currently exist or are being considered to varying 
degrees by governments around the world (including the NHSX/UK government), we identified ten 
potential app attributes and various sub-options of these attributes that could be relevant for a UK 
contact tracing app (see Table 1 on p. 10 for a complete list). A UK wide representative sample of 
2061 respondents was then asked to give their preferences using a partial profile choice-based 
conjoint design with a dual response/none option (Wlömert & Eggers, 2016). More information about 
our sample can be found in Appendix I. Further information of the research design and detailed 
analyses are available from the authors, or publicly at the Open Science Framework.   
 
Simulations of App Adoption Rates 
Based on the individual preference functions of respondents for the different app attributes and 
attribute options, we can simulate adoption rates for various app configurations.  
We ran simulations for four potential apps: 1) an “Expected NHSX” app that the NHSX/UK government 
have announced (based on our interpretation of press coverage and NHSX blogs), 2) a “Big Brother” 
app that does not respect privacy and civil liberties, 3) a “Maximum Adoption” app that would reach 
the highest adoption, regardless of implications for privacy and civil liberties, and 4) a 
“Recommended” app that would reach the highest adoption while safeguarding privacy and civil 
liberties.  
In Figure 1, we list all ten app attribute options that were used to simulate the different configurations 
in order of their importance for adoption choice .  
It should be noted that these are “ideal” adoption rates, since 100% of our respondents were informed 
about the app and made considered adoption choices. Real-life adoption rates would be expected 
to be lower.  
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Figure 1 shows the adoption rates that the four app configurations can achieve (reminder: 60% 
adoption is need for the app to be effective, see Ferretti et al., 2020): 
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App 1: “Expected NHSX” 
The “Expected NHSX” app achieves the lowest adoption rate with 51.1%. This is primarily due to two 
factors. Our analysis found that there are two attributes that are most important in determining 
respondents’ choice for an app configuration. First, it is very important who is responsible for the app 
and has oversight. Current news reports create the perception that the UK’s contact tracing app 
development is spearheaded by the government. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care 
is the primary spokesperson for the app in the media and the government’s healthtech blog publishes 
updates about the app. However, our respondents show a clear preference for the NHS to be fully in 
charge. Second, respondents want the app to be linked to testing, so that those in self-isolation get 
priority access to testing for COVID-19. Currently, no plans to link the app to priority testing have been 
announced.  
App 2: “Big Brother” 
The authoritarian “Big Brother” app achieves a slightly higher adoption rate with 54.6%. This is due to 
the assumption that testing for suspected COVID-19 cases would be provided, which respondents 
seem to value more than protecting their privacy and civil liberties.  
App 3: “Maximum Adoption” 
The maximum adoption rate that any app could reach in our simulation is 77.6%. However, this 
configuration potentially infringes upon civil liberties by using the app for monitoring purposes, as well 
as privacy by uploading location data and storing data for longer than necessary. Therefore, we 
would not recommend the implementation of these options, even though they would slightly increase 
app adoption.  
App 4: “Recommended” 
Our “Recommended” app, unlike the “Maximum Adoption” app, is not used to monitor or enforce 
self-isolation, stores data for only 14 days, and does not upload any location data. This privacy and 
civil liberties respecting app can reach 73.5% adoption. 
 
 
Key Findings and Recommendations  
We studied the impact of ten potential attributes that could be relevant for a UK contact tracing app 
on adoption likelihood. The results are summarized in Table 1. Our analysis shows that some attributes 
are significantly more important than others in determining respondents’ app adoption choices. The 
order of attribute importance is remarkably robust and stable for different segments of the UK 
population (see detailed results by segment here). 
Within each attribute, we investigated a range of implementation options. Some options impact 
choice positively, others negatively. Please note that the impact of the different options is relative to 
each other within each attribute (i.e., in Table 1, changing the oversight from the NHS to an 
independent oversight body would reduce adoption; but changing it from the government to an 
independent oversight body would increase adoption).  
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Table 1: App Attributes and Attribute Options  
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As can be seen from Table 1, the top four attributes collectively explain 60.1% of respondents’ app 
adoption choices. We will focus the remainder of this whitepaper on these top four attributes and 
discuss the implications of the relative importance of different attribute options in more detail. A full 
analysis of all attributes is available by contacting the authors.  
 
 
Attribute 1: Responsibility and Oversight 
As shown in Table 2, respondents are 
most likely to adopt a contact tracing 
app if the NHS is responsible and has 
oversight. They also respond positively 
to an independent oversight body, but 
do not want the government or a 
private tech firm in charge.  
The impact of these attribute options 
on app adoption does not change for 
different segments of the population 
(see detailed results by segment here). 
It is noteworthy that less people will adopt the contact tracing app if the government is seen to be in 
charge. This view is also reflected in the open comments by respondents: 
“If [this app] is truly used for the purpose identified then I have no problem. But - and it is a big but - I 
do not trust the Government to play by their own stated rules. They are all adept at not telling the truth 
and using personal data for other purposes.” (Anonymous Survey Respondent)   
 
Recommendation 1: The governance of the app should be clearly set out, with a view to 
putting the NHS in charge and possibly involving an independent oversight body. 
Importantly, the government should not be, nor perceived to be, in control of the app.  
 
 
 
 
Attribute 2: Additional Benefits of App Use 
The likelikhood of app adoption 
significantly increases if the app offered 
additional relevant benefits. As shown in 
Table 3, not offering any additional 
benefits reduces adoption. However, it is 
also clear that not all benefits are 
created equal in terms of driving 
adoption. For example, the possibility of 
receiving information about how busy 
local amenities are does not seem to 
interest respondents and reduces app adoption. In contrast, respondents are most likely to adopt the 
app if it facilitated priority access to testing during self-isolation.  
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Respondents seem aware that mass 
contact tracing can only work in 
conjunction with mass testing, as 
suggested by researchers (Ferretti et al., 
2020; Salathé et al., 2020). As illustrated 
in Figure 2(a), 79% of respondents agree 
or strongly agree that “testing capacity 
will be essential to manage the spread 
of COVID-19 after lockdown.” However, 
respondents are not confident that “the 
government will be able to achieve 
widespread testing by the time the 
lockdown is lifted,” since only 36% of 
respondents agree or strongly agree 
with this statement.  
 
 
 
 
The belief in whether the government 
will be able to achieve widespread 
testing strongly impacts respondents’ 
app adoption choices: Respondents 
who do not believe that widespread 
testing can be achieved by the time the 
lockdown is lifted are less likely to adopt 
a contact tracing app than those who 
are neutral or do believe that it can be 
achieved. This difference is illustrated in 
Figure 2(b).  
 
 
 
Apart from testing, respondents’ adoption of the app would also increase if it facilitated booking food 
delivery slots for those in self-isolation.  
The impact of these attribute options on app adoption does not change for different segments of the 
population (see detailed results by segment here).  
 
 
Recommendation 2: The app should be linked to testing, so that those in self-isolation 
(because they are symptomatic or have been alerted by the app of a possible infection) 
can get tested quickly. In addition, it is important to convince the public that this testing 
capacity is in fact achieved and functional. Providing priority booking for food delivery slots 
when in self-isolation would also support app adoption.  
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Attribute 3: Monitoring and/or Enforcing of Self-Isolation 
A somewhat unexpected finding is that 
app adoption increases if the app is 
used to monitor self-isolation by sending 
alerts (e.g., push notifications). As shown 
in Table 4, respondents’ app adoption 
slightly decreases if the app does not 
provide any monitoring, and strongly 
decreases if the app is used to enforce 
self-isolation with punitive means. The 
impact of these attribute options on app adoption does not change for different segments of the 
population (see detailed results by segment here).  
A possible explanation for this finding is that respondents think of monitoring others rather than 
themselves when judging this attribute. Respondents’ open comments indicate that they do not have 
much faith in other people observing COVID-19 guidance, for example:  
“In fact, I think it would be a good idea to monitor people’s movements as I know loads of people 
who are blatantly flouting the guidelines set out by the government.” (Anonymous Survey 
Respondent)   
Thus, some form of light-handed monitoring through technology seems to be acceptable, whereas 
heavy-handed enforcement with punitive means is not accepted. We know from prior literature that 
citizens are generally more willing to relinquish civil liberties in times of crisis (e.g., Murray & Wunsch, 
2002). This presents a dilemma for decision makers: while monitoring self-isolation brings about 
marginal benefits in terms of app adoption, it potentially comes at the expense of infringing upon civil 
liberties. In light of this, we consider opting for safeguarding civil liberties a better strategy.  
 
Recommendation 3: The app should not be used for monitoring or enforcement purposes.  
 
Attribute 4: Freedom of Movement 
Table 5 indicates that respondents do 
not support requiring app use for 
returning to work, and this finding is 
stable across all segments. However, the 
picture is more nuanced when it comes 
to making app use entirely optional or 
making it compulsory for any movement. 
Overall, respondents are slightly more 
likely to choose an app that is voluntary, 
but the impact of requiring the app for any movement on app choice is neutral.   
Respondents’ open comments show that this is a particularly polarizing issue, with some strongly 
advocating for compulsory app use and others strongly opposing it. For example: 
“I think this is a unique situation and we need to take drastic measures at this time, the app should be 
compulsory, and people should be required to use it if they want to leave the house. People clearly 
cannot be trusted to follow the rules that are laid out for everyone’s safety, so we need to take away 
the right for them to choose and make it compulsory.” (Anonymous Survey Respondent)   
“The whole idea is a complete invasion of privacy, it is “Big Brother” monitoring citizens & is outrageous. 
Luckily, I don’t have a smartphone, so even if it became compulsory, I don’t care!” (Anonymous 
Survey Respondent)   
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For this attribute, the impact of the 
different attribute options on app 
adoption changes for different 
segments of the population. 
Specifically, those with primary 
education, those with an extremely 
conservative political orientation, and 
women have a preference for 
compulsory app use. But even more 
than demographic variables, 
preference for optional versus 
compulsory app use is driven by 
attitude (see Figure 3). Compulsory 
app use is preferred by respondents 
who strongly agree that “widespread 
contact tracing will be essential to manage the spread of COVID-19 after lockdown” and “digital 
technologies can be effective in monitoring the spread of COVID-19 infections after the lockdown,” 
as well as respondents who strongly agree that they are “afraid of COVID-19.”  
Even though some segments support compulsory app use and the effect of this option on adoption is 
neutral, making app use entirely optional is the preferred implementation option and increases 
adoption.  
 
Recommendation 4: App use should be voluntary and not linked to freedom of movement.  
 
 
 
Remaining Attributes 
Table 1 shows the relative importance of the remaining six attributes and respondents’ preferences 
for the different attribute options. We would like to briefly highlight two unexpected findings.  
First, we find that respondents choose to share their data longer than the necessary 14 days (the 
incubation period of COVID-19). Instead, they expressed a preference for their data to be stored 
until the COVID-19 pandemic is over. This indicates that respondents are willing to share their data in 
a way they perceive useful in fighting the pandemic. However, they also want to have a clear end 
point, as they did not support their data being stored “for as long as necessary.” 
Second, respondents are more likely to choose an app that uploads their location data than one 
that does not. This is surprising because the collection of location data is the more invasive option. 
From our analysis of the open comments of respondents, one possible explanation for this finding is 
that respondents do not fully understand Bluetooth-enabled contact tracing. Instead, they believe 
that location data is necessary for the app to function effectively.  
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Further Insights 
We also observe some general differences in adoption likelihood for a contact tracing app – 
regardless of its configuration – among different segments of the population.  
 
Demographic Differences in Adoption 
In terms of age, preference for adopting an app goes down for respondents aged 50-64, and 
respondents aged 65+ are least likely to adopt any app at all. Those aged 25-34 have the highest 
preference for app adoption (see Figure 4(a)). In terms of household income, preference for app 
adoption increases with higher levels of income. It is important to note that people with lower incomes 
and older people are less likely to own a smartphone, and that older people might feel 
technologically challenged using apps. In terms of gender, women have stronger preferences for the 
app than men. In terms of ethnicity, 
Black people and Asian people have 
stronger preferences for the app than 
White people. This finding is only 
tentative as sample sizes are small for 
Black people (n=66) and Asian people 
(n=115). Finally, respondents who live in 
London have a stronger preference for 
adopting the app than respondents 
living in the rest of England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. This is 
likely an indication that the app 
appeals more to residents of densely 
populated areas.  
 
 
Attitudinal Differences in Adoption 
Preference for adopting a contact 
tracing app is positively correlated with 
fear of COVID-19 (see Figure 4(b)), and 
also higher for respondents who have 
either themselves or whose family and 
friends have been diagnosed with or 
experienced symptoms of COVID-19. 
Likewise, people who lost someone to 
COVID-19 also strongly prefer the 
adoption of a contact tracing app. 
Moreover, preference for the app goes 
up for respondents who self-report 
financial losses and those who self-
report a negative impact on their mental 
health due to the lockdown.  
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Respondents who strongly disagree or disagree with the statement “I trust the information I receive 
about COVID-19 from the government” are less likely to adopt an app, as are those who strongly 
disagree or disagree with the statement that “the government’s priority is saving lives.” Finally, 
respondents who strongly disagree or disagree that “widespread contact tracing will be essential to 
manage the spread of COVID-19 after lockdown” and that “digital technologies can be effective in 
monitoring the spread of COVID-19 infections after the lockdown” are less likely to adopt any app. As 
mentioned previously, this is also true for respondents who strongly disagree or disagree that “the 
government will be able to achieve widespread testing capacity by the time the lock down is lifted.” 
 
Recommendation 5: These demographic and attitudinal differences should inform the 
communication strategy surrounding the launch of the app.  
 
Other concerns 
An analysis of the open comments left by respondents shows that many people worry about either 
not owning a smartphone themselves, or about what will happen to those who do not own a 
smartphone. In addition, despite having received a clear explanation about Bluetooth-enabled 
contact tracing, many respondents were wondering if the app would work without wifi or 4G. These 
are important concerns to address when introducing a contact tracing app in the UK. 
 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
In times of crisis, we are often willing to compromise on some aspects of privacy and civil liberties for 
the greater good. This study indeed finds that our respondents are willing to share more data and 
accept more invasive measures than would be imaginable in “normal” times. This is why decision-
makers involved in the design and launch of a contact tracing app have an enormous responsibility 
to get it right. They must strike a fine balance in designing and implementing a contact-tracing app 
that on the one hand relies on our cooperation and personal data to be effective, but on the other 
hand does not overreach into our willingness to make sacrifices and share personal data to combat 
this pandemic. This whitepaper presents the summary of key insights and recommendations on how 
to strike this balance. Based on our analysis, we recommend a specific contact tracing app 
configuration that can achieve sufficient widespread adoption to be effective while protecting privacy 
and civil liberties.   
We, the authors, are available to discuss the details of our study and full recommendations.  
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